Americans for Peace Now

Ori Nir

Hello, everyone. Welcome to this Americans for Peace Now webinar with Palestinian political scientist Khalil Shikaki. I'm Or Nir with APN. Before we start, our usual comments, the webinar is recorded, the video recording will be available on our YouTube channel. The audio will be posted on our podcast, PeaceCast. You are welcome to ask questions throughout the webinar, you actually can start doing that right now. And the way you do it is using the Q&A tool that's at the bottom of your screen, not the raise hand tool, but the Q&A tool. And I would ask if you can keep your questions short because we go through them throughout the webinar, and it's kind of difficult to read long comments and so on. In the past few months, we've been focused on the political crisis in Israel. But you know, Israel's Palestinian neighbors are experiencing an ongoing crisis of their own partly because of their relationship with Israel and partly irrespective of that. The crisis there is political, diplomatic, economic, social, really multifaceted, and it's clearly manifested in public opinions and attitudes. Dr. Khalil Shikaki is the leading Palestinian pollster. He runs a think tank in Ramallah called the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR). It takes the pulse of the Palestinian public in the West Bank and Gaza on a regular basis. The results of its recent polls show how deep the level of mistrust and disappointment and frustration and hopelessness is among Palestinians. And it's really quite stunning when you look at the results. Khalil is a longtime guest, longtime friend of APN, longtime guest on our webinars and podcasts. He hosts us in person annually when we visit his office in Ramallah, which we just did recently. In the past, when we spoke with him publicly on such occasions as webinars and so on, we asked him to accentuate the positive. In our conversation today, I guess we'll explore whether there's any positive to accentuate. Things are pretty grim. Khalil, thank you for joining us.

Khalil Shikaki

Thank you, Ori, good to be with you.

Ori Nir

Khalil, let's start with a broad question. How would you characterize the Palestinian reaction to the new Israeli government? And let's talk both about the reaction among the Palestinian leadership, policies, positioning, etc. Can you refer both to the leadership in the West Bank, and Hamas in Gaza, but also public reactions, public attitudes?

Khalil Shikaki

Actually, this is a very good question to begin with, because it helps us to set the frame for the discussion about Palestinian politics. So let me sort of give a background to how Palestinians view various Israeli governments. In the past, the PA faced two types of Israeli governments. You have left wing and right wing, sometimes the center joining one or the other. But in both types the settlement issue has been the Achilles heel of the peace process. This was destructive to the ability of the PA to build support for the idea that there is a partner for peace in Israel. Nonetheless, the PA measured or assist its relations with these two types of governments, the left and the right, based on two things. One, the extent to which there was room for progress towards ending the occupation. And the second was the extent to which the Israeli government they were dealing with was perceived or viewed as one that favored a strong PA and so it saw a strong PA as an essential Israeli need. The left and the center were welcome despite the settlement concerns, because progress was feasible in the peace process, even if no agreements were reached. And because a strong PA was seen as a partner, or at least, this is how the PA perceived the manner in which the Israeli government viewed it. This has been the case for Rabin and for Barak and for Olmert's governments. On the other hand, right wing governments were not welcomed because of the belief that they were not committed to the two-state solution. And then because the PA perceived that their interests, the interests of the of the right wing, lied in a weak, not a strong PA. Naturally, this led occasionally to greater friction and sometimes even violence. Nonetheless, with these two types of governments, left and right, the conflict was mostly about border, land, and security. What the PA found earlier this year is that it is now facing a new type of government one with which it did not have to deal in the past, one in which the conflict in fact, goes back to its original roots as an existential conflict, not only over land and security, but also over identity, holy places, us versus them, and with a religious dimension. As an added bonus, without a possible meeting ground. And new Israel is emerging in the eyes of the PA and the Hamas shares with that sentiment, Hamas leadership. This new Israel is characterized by its national religious identity, compared to the national secular Israel of the past. The PA came to the conclusion that its own mere existence, even as a weak PA, was no longer guaranteed, was no longer the expressed interest of this new Israel. Since its creation, the PA has never confronted this sort of twofold or double-threat, the one that ends the prospects for peace. But most significantly, some Palestinians would say, one that poses a threat to the mere existence of the PA. So there should be no doubt that the PA will not under these conditions be able to maintain the kind of cooperation or even the kind of security control it has been able to maintain in the past. The capacity and the motivation of the PA to do so are currently suffering as a result of the formation of the new national religious government in Israel. We have already seen this, this capacity security capacity eroding in some of the areas where the Palestinian national sentiment as opposed to the religious sentiments was high or higher than the religious sentiment as the case has been in the northern part of the West Bank. This has been traditionally Fatah land, secular and nationalist. What contributed to this development has been an additional driver there is homemade, that is separate from Israel and its policies. It's in the domestic setting. But turning back now to your question.

Ori Nir

What do you mean by that, something caused that is "homemade?"

Khalil Shikaki

Well, that is the development in the domestic political scene, the PA losing legitimacy, losing credibility in the eyes of the Palestinian public, seen as weak, as authoritarian and corrupt without electoral legitimacy. This is a domestic development that has its roots in the developments since the last elections in 2006. And the split between the West Bank and Gaza, this has created significant levels of discontent, particularly among young Palestinians. This discontent is not being expressed in direct violence against the PA but rather in challenging the PA's monopoly over coercive force, and the fact that these groups are the foot soldiers, the rank and file are secular and nationalist, rather than Islamist. They're not Hamas or Islamic Jihad, although Hamas and Islamic Jihad do strongly support them, and with all kinds of assistance with a financial or arms or training. Nonetheless, the foot soldiers are secular nationalists, with links to Fatah and the PA. And so the PA finds it very difficult to go after them for fears of a war. It's not like going after a Hamas infrastructure. And this has been the additional driver that has led to the to the willingness of large number of young Palestinians to challenge the PAs monopoly over course of force and to create these armed groups. But I was going to turn to the popular level, you asked how both the PA leadership and that of Hamas, and the public at large, there is a difference between the two. The difference between the new Israel and the old Israel is not really as significant as it is for the PA. It's not as significant for the Palestinian public, for the public. The right wing governments in Israel were as bad as the current national religious government, as the criteria here is focused. I mean the Palestinian public is focused almost entirely on the prospects for ending the occupation. However, even with the public, the new Israel is an added threat, one that is focused on holy places like Al Aqsa Mosque and to a lesser extent, on the perception that the speed of creeping annexation will now be much faster, and the cruelty of occupation will be now greater.

Ori Nir

I want to ask you a little bit about, you know, you mentioned the Palestinian Authority and its weaknesses. It really is suffering from almost every kind of crisis from economic to governability to the succession issue, public confidence and security and so on and so forth. How stable is the PA? How does it continue to survive and function? And what are its sustainability prospects in a post-Abbas era? Mahmoud Abbas is old and getting older, is there a way of resurrecting it as a credible administrator at all in the future?

Khalil Shikaki

Ah, well, you you wanted some optimism. Seeing the cup half full, rather than half empty, actually in this question, I can be as optimistic as you want in answering your last part of the vast number of questions here. So let me begin by answering them one after the other. The PA is highly resilient, because the elite in control will fight for it, as it fights for its own survival. The public is not as committed to it. But there is nonetheless significant fears, even among the public that life without it, particularly with regard to service delivery in certain areas like health, education, social security, and perhaps even to some extent law enforcement. These are things that the public will miss very much the PA collapses or is dissolved. Nonetheless, given the significant erosion in governance, legitimacy and trust in the PA that I mentioned earlier, the perception that or the motivation on the part of the Palestinian public to challenge the authority is very high. Israeli incursions of course, provide the justification for young men to arm and organize and challenge the PAs monopoly over coercive force as I indicated earlier. The threat so far, however, is manageable, because these groups target Israelis for now, mostly settlers and army, but rather than the PA. So nonetheless, let me say that the threat these groups pose is difficult for the PA to deal with, contain or eliminate. And I've mentioned some of the reasons for that. One, which I mentioned was the fact that the foot soldiers are mostly nationals, and many of them are Fatah based. But the second is that the PA does not really have almost any support among the public to act against these groups. The public so far has been overwhelmingly in favor of the formation of the groups with no legitimacy or trust. Therefore, the PA does not want to risk a confrontation with these groups for fear of civil war. But this logic leads to a vicious cycle. Army incursions double and triple. In fact, last year, the number of Israeli army occasions tripled in numbers. And in order to do what the PA cannot do, the army wants to do that. This in turn weakens the PA or weakens the PA further and help to diminish its credibility, thereby increasing the popularity of the armed groups and increase the number of people wanting to join them, which in turn leads to an even greater number of incursions, army incursions and so on. Right now, this is the most significant potential threat to the stability of the Palestinian Authority. Now add to that, two more things, and you have mentioned one of them. But I will start with the other one. The new Israel, the new Israeli government seems determined to punish the PA for policies it doesn't like. And this takes financial form of financial constraints, withholding some of the funds, or the clearance funds from the PA, the PA cannot pay salaries in full. This has been the case in the in recent past, but it is now even worse, because of the additional cuts or deductions that the new Israel, the new government has made. The PA therefore becomes weaker and weaker. And the second is what you asked –

Ori Nir

Just to mention here. Khalil, I'm sorry that I'm barging. But if I understand correctly, there is a teacher strike now. And I've seen mountains of refuse in Palestinian cities. What's happening with that?

Khalil Shikaki

The PA cannot pay salaries and fall. And these teachers have been promised for two years that their salaries will be raised. And the PA has not been able to implement its commitments. So this is part, this is not the only reason, but this is part of the reason for that. These strikes have been, this particular strike and fact is now into his third month. And these are teachers who teach in public schools. And so they the kids are without school. And so you think families would be angry, yet, more than two thirds of the public in the West Bank, in fact, more than 70% in our latest survey, say they support the teachers in their strike against the PA. And now, the truth is the PA does not have the resources to pay any increase and it is not even able to pay at the previous rates. Yet, if we now ask the public is this the reason why the PA is unable to comply with the demands of the teachers? The overwhelming majority will say no, the PA has all the resources it needs to pay them but the PA is lying, the PA is corrupt the PA and so on. So the lack of trust in the PA creates an environment that rewards any mutiny or any attempt. These teachers are not attempting mutiny, but they are challenging the Palestinian Authority. And so any challenge will be rewarded by public support. This goes for the armed groups as it goes for the teachers who are currently striking.

Ori Nir

But you wanted to add another –

Khalil Shikaki

Yes and that is what you asked about which is Abbas, his age and his health. Now in his absence assuming we're not able to do anything before that, to resolve the problems that I'm about to talk about. In his absence, we're most likely to see anarchy and perhaps even some violence, inter-Palestinian violence, and perhaps even inter-Fatah violence, this violence could erupt. And if it does, the likelihood that it will, in my view is greater than the likelihood that it will not. That will provide a context for a much greater breakdown of the PAs ability to enforce law or maintain security. The vacuum that exists today is relatively small, the vacuum in terms of the ability of the Palestinian Authority to enforce law and order and ensure monopoly over course, so forth and so on. This vacuum that led to the emergence of these groups. But without Abbas, this vacuum could become much bigger, leading to a greater expansion of armed groups and the entry of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and possibly even Fatah into this business of arming and confronting the Israeli army and challenging whoever is trying to control the Palestinian Authority. So is there a way, your question, the one that I think does have a good answer, if the PA wants one, which is an optimistic answer, is that there is indeed a way to prevent that and ensure a stronger PA one that is indeed capable of gaining control over security and in the future, manage any succession issues or, or just manages the the normal process of succession. The answer is that indeed, there is. One, there is a prospect for that. But it's not really, it's not great. And that lies in holding elections and reunifying, the West Bank and Gaza, holding elections or reunifying the West Bank and Gaza will not lead to the return of Hamas to the control of the PA there is almost zero chance that Hamas would win the next elections. Given the changes in the in our electoral system, the prospect of that happening is almost zero. But and of course, if that happens, the PA will indeed regain huge amount of legitimacy and support right away. And but it will be a PA without Abbas. And we would avert the entire issue of succession. But let's assume that we only go for parliamentary elections and Abbas remains president and we do not hold presidential elections, which is most feasible. This is the scenario that Abbas was going to implement in 2021 and before he decided to cancel all elections altogether. But if Abbas remains in this scenario that I'm now putting forward, and we confront a legitimate question of succession after him. The fact that we would have a parliament provides all we need for a very smooth succession process. Pretty much similar to what happened when Arafat died in 2004. That's how much optimism I can give you.

Ori Nir

Well, that's something given the fact that we're about to dive into further grimness. So, I wanted to now shift a little bit to public opinion, ask you a few questions about that. I looked, I really kind of read very thoroughly the findings of your latest poll, the March poll, and the picture is grim. Let's try to break down and discuss the makeup of that bleak picture. A vast majority of those polled in your March 2023 poll both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, are unsatisfied with Mahmoud Abbas' performance, I think it was 77% combined. You also asked whether people think the PA is an accomplishment or a burden for the Palestinians. And again, I'm quite surprised that 63%, a solid majority, said that it's a burden whereas only 33% said it was an accomplishment. If such a question were asked, I don't know, 15-20 years ago, it would have probably been the other way around. Anyway, a large majority last month also said that they think Abbas should resign. So my question to you, when we take all of these together are what are the main reasons, you've mentioned some of them earlier, but are the reasons for the frustration with Abbas more a message of people's disappointment with his political path of negotiations with Israel in peace process? Or is it more about the inability of the PA to deliver as an administrator, as a government?

Khalil Shikaki

You're right about our findings. And in fact, when we ask the question about the PA the majority, that slim majority, but a majority, nonetheless, that we found, viewing the collapse or the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority as serving the national interest. In fact, we also had a majority, a large majority that said, the continued existence of the Palestinian Authority serves the national interests of the state of Israel, rather than the Palestinians. This is unprecedented because the last time, well we've been asking about this for at least 12 years, and the first time when we asked about it, only a small minority of 15% said, we should dissolve the PA or allowed to collapse. And we now have I think our survey showed 52% who said that it would be fine if it collapses or that indeed this would serve the national interests of the Palestinians. The reason for that is that level of discontent with the PA has indeed been on the rise during the last decade in particular. The trust and the PA has been diminishing, its legitimacy has been diminishing. And this is particularly true among young Palestinians. What has been driving this, or things most importantly, even before we come to the collapsed Israeli-Palestinian peace process, is the greater authoritarianism in the political system. The PA is being seen by the overwhelming majority of the public as a one man show, that is a very important driver of the discontent, the absence of elections is another driver. Abbas has been in office since 2005. It's now 13 years of him in the government without electoral legitimacy. So his term was for four years and that, the absence of elections since it is the man who is who stands to lose the elections, who is responsible for the absence of elections, there is a significant public demand for elections with the belief that the PA will not be holding elections. That's what we found our most recent survey, found the overwhelming majority wanting elections, but also thinking that it will not happen anytime soon. There is a third reason for the discontent, and that had to do with the weakened institutional design of the Palestinian Authority. The judiciary has been essentially left totally lacking in independence. There is no legislature. So there is no accountability, there is no oversight in the entire political system. This is one reason why if there is a succession process right now, under current condition, there is concern about what I mentioned earlier, the anarchy and the potential for intra-Palestinian violence. There are two additional reasons that are beyond the issues of governance and so on. And that is the failed reunification of the West Bank and Gaza. Overtime, when the split between the West Bank and Gaza took place in 2007. And for almost seven years after that the public blamed Hamas, but since 2014, and particularly since 2017, we have seen a clear majority among the public that blames Abbas with the failure of the of reunification between the West Bank and Gaza, Finally comes the issue of the belief that Abbas is too soft on Israel. That is, his lacking in credibility, he makes all kinds of facts with no intention whatsoever of implementing any of those. And the latest of this, the latest lack of credibility is the perception that the PA has declared its ending security coordination. But the overwhelming majority does not believe that the PA has indeed ended security coordination. And in fact, there is a greater evidence that this public perception is more accurate than the declared statement by the PA that it has ended security coordination with Israel. The lack of credibility is particularly evident in defending Palestinians take Huwara and then the incident in Huwara when settlers attacked the town. Huwara is in Area B, the main road is in Area B. And the Palestinian Authority has the jurisdiction over law and order in these areas. It does not have security jurisdiction, but it does have law enforcement jurisdiction. Where where the Palestinian police then, the Palestinian public asks. Why for four hours settlers were destroying the town, but not a single Palestinian policeman showed up. That is their responsibility. But Huwara is just one example, where the Palestinian public basically says we pay somewhere between a quarter to 1/3 of our budget to our security sector, and it's unable to deliver security for us when we need it. Why do we need this security sector and the public tends, because of this policy of the PA refraining from confronting settlers in areas where it is their jurisdiction to confront the settlers and protect the Palestinian civilians, and the PA fails to do so. This creates this deep gap between the Palestinian public and increases the level of discontent.

Ori Nir

I want to ask you about the popular positions and attitudes regarding the two state solution. There are quite a few questions in the Q&A. And by the way, people are welcome to add more. There's some good questions there and I'll address them soon. I'm suspecting that one reason for those questions is that there were several U.S. scholars who published an article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs proposing advocating a radical shift in U.S. policy on Israel-Palestine from the two state paradigm to a kind of a one state policy where both Israelis and Palestinians would enjoy equal rights. Now, most Palestinians seem to reject this idea, to not support the idea of a one state solution, so called, they also don't seem to be supportive of a two state solution if I understand correctly, the findings of your poll. What do they support? What and why wouldn't would they support those two models?

Khalil Shikaki

So let me put this in context. Support for the two state solution 30 years ago, when the peace process started, when Oslo was signed was 80-85%. And support right now is just 27%. The decline in support for the two state solution has been gradual, year after year. But the last five years in particular have been the hardest. Now, we have seen over the years that the support, particularly when we started to see a decline and support for the two state solution that this decline was generated, essentially, by the perception that the two state solution, because of settlement expansion is no longer feasible, that it is no longer you are unable to separate the two peoples into two separate states. Now this is the perception of the public whether it's true or not is a different question. But that is the prevailing perception. Now, we have seen that those who come to this conclusion that the two state solution is no longer feasible and those who have come to this conclusion unfortunately, today are more than 70% of the Palestinian public. They basically abandoned support the minute they reached this conclusion, which the percentage of those who have come to this conclusion has been on the rise since the day Netanyahu became prime minister in 2009. And in fact, this is when the original decline, we still had a majority at that time, but at that point, we started to see a speedy decline in support for the two state solution. Because at that time, we started to see a significant rise in the perception that the two state solution is no longer feasible. So what happened to those who back then, around this time, were abandoning the two state solution? Where did they go? Well, they went to support a one state solution with equal rights, most of them were young people who wanted equal rights. And the idea of independence and sovereignty, while important, was not as important as the demand for equal rights, particularly since they have come to the conclusion that sovereignty and independence is no longer feasible. So the least they could have, in their view was equal rights. So those who abandoned the two solution went to supporting a one state solution. However, in May 2021 during the Hamas-Israel war, the violence in mixed changed all of this significantly. That is, I'm now referring to the support for the one state solution support for the one state solution, which stood at about a third at that time, which a third is not the highest we've ever been, we've actually reached, we had more than a third at one point. But a third was where we were back then declined almost immediately after the May war. And it hasn't recovered since then. And so even though I've said earlier, the support for the two state solution is now only 27%. Well, support for the one state solution is even less than that. So this 27% is still relatively more than the support for any other solution. There is a third solution, of course, there are three visions in Palestinian society today for this, actually, there are four now I'll tell you what happened to the fourth one. But the third one is Hamas' vision, which is an Islamic and Arab state, where Jews can live here if they want to, but they should not expect equal rights. So it is a one state solution, but without equal rights for Israeli Jews. This is the third and the level of support right now is highest with a two state solution followed by a one state solution with equal rights. And thirdly, for a one state solution without equal rights. And however, fourthly, the group that you've asked, what do they support? Well, the group that is growing in size, is the group that believes there is nothing to support, because there is no political solution to the conflict, that the conflict is essentially permanent and will never be resolved. This is the highest of the frustration and the despair that we see among the Palestinian public. This group of Palestinians, which now stands somewhere between 20 to 25%, has essentially lost all hopes. And we do find the greatest level of support for violence among this group, because this group does not believe in diplomacy or negotiations anymore. But they do not necessarily share Hamas' values or support Hamas' has vision.

Ori Nir

So I just wanted to sharpen something interesting that you said earlier that there was a change following the the May 2021 events. If I understand correctly, the question that you asked regarding the one state solution has to do with the vision of a one state where Jews and Arabs enjoy equal rights. If I understand correctly, what happened in May 2021 was that people saw that even inside Israel where Jews and Arabs, to a large extent enjoy equal rights, even then the conflict doesn't come to an end. The embers are still burning. Is that is that the case?

Khalil Shikaki

Absolutely. Indeed, that that essentially, despite the fact that this is sort of an implementation of a one state solution would be not necessarily agree that there's equal rights. But still, this is the vision. In fact, when sometimes when we asked about a one state solution, sometimes we say similar to what we now see in Israel, with Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs, something like this. And we do find support for that, again, not a majority, but but a small percentage of those who support a one state solution with equal rights do support that kind of solution. What they saw in May 2021, was that the conflict erupts at the first opportunity that there is violence and that this solution is not what they thought it would be, that there will not be equal rights and that violence will continue to haunt them, even if they go that way. Now, it did not necessarily lead to an increase in demand or support for a two state solution. But one should not confuse the support for the two state solution with the demand of the Palestinians to have a state of their own and to end the Israeli occupation. It is the belief that a two state solution coming as a result of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that is being attacked right now. But the idea that Israeli occupation can end and the Palestinians can then have the opportunity to create their own state, that is something that continues to be the top priority of the Palestinians in all of our surveys. There has almost never been a change since we've been asking about this, that the top priority for the Palestinian public continues to be ending occupation and building a Palestinian state. But as I said earlier, this should not be confused with the two state solution in which the creation of a Palestinian state is dependent on an agreement with Israel that is now no longer feasible.

Ori Nir

Good. I'm looking at the clock and I'm looking at the number of questions and the kind of weight of questions we have. An interesting question has to do with Jerusalem. There's someone here who asked what's happening in Jerusalem? When you do your polls, you don't question people in Jerusalem.

Khalil Shikaki

We do.

Ori Nir

You do, okay. So are they included in in the West Bank?

Khalil Shikaki

Yes.

Ori Nir

I see. Okay. Now, you do, however, have a separate kind of comparison poll on your website. I would encourage everyone to look at it and maybe Maxxe can put a link to it. There's an essay there, which compares a poll that was taken in 2010 to one that was taken last year. And the results, I thought the results are fascinating. What to me, they show and I wanted to ask you, if you agree, and if so how do you what do you make out of it? Is that there's actually the emergence of a separate identity of East Jerusalemite Palestinians that is somewhat separate from West Bank Palestinians, you now have, you know, Gaza Strip Palestinian identity, West Bank, and to some extent at least in a separate East Jerusalem one. Is that correct? Do you agree with that?

Khalil Shikaki

Well, the word identity is loaded, it's difficult for one to agree without knowing what it contains. But there is no doubt that the East Jerusalemites are in our surveys and this is not new to us, although the survey you refer to is one that has been with a much larger sample than we normally sample in issues. But there is no doubt that East Jerusalemites share certain views and attitudes about the conflict that are not shared by other Palestinians. What characterizes the perception of East Jerusalemites towards the conflict is a variety of perceptions and interest that have during the past decade led to greater detachment from the Palestinian body politic. The failed peace process, the failed Second Intifada, the building of the separation barrier. And this particular one, this barrier, which when completed, shifted the socioeconomic focus of the socioeconomic life of East Jerusalemites westward when before that it was eastward. So add to what I've just said the discuss with the PA governance, the feeling of abandonment, all these have contributed to the current situation which East Jerusalemites feel totally abandoned by the PA, and by the Palestinians in general that nobody cares. Again, their perception about their destiny and future. And this has led to the situation in which they, like the other Palestinians, think there is no solution, that the two state solution is dead and they have to decide they can't continue to live in limbo. And so their socioeconomic life is changing. As I said earlier, with West Jerusalem and the rest of Israel are becoming the center of their life, rather than the West Bank. And that has led to these very interesting changes in our findings, comparing the 2010 and the 2022 results that do show indeed that there is significant detachment from the Palestinian body politic.

Ori Nir

Since I see that there is a great deal of interest in the idea of support for two state solution. I want to ask you one more question about it. I may be splitting hairs here. But I think it's I think it's worthwhile trying to address this. When you're asked about your support for two state solution as a Palestinian, it implies two things. One is support for statehood and for the Palestinian national movement. The other implied is support for Israel to continue existing as a you know, an independent state. Did you ever –

Khalil Shikaki

And thirdly, you are also supporting diplomatic venue for resolving the conflict.

Ori Nir

Right. So have you ever tried to separate the two and to try to gauge if there is, for example, any decline in support for Palestinian national sovereignty and statehood as compared to the decline of support for two state solution? See what I mean?

Khalil Shikaki

Yes, indeed, there is, we do see a little bit of a decline in support for the idea of statehood, even when it is no longer linked to a two state solution negotiations and so on. The reason for that is that the behavior, the failure of the Palestinian Authority in governance, in recent years, has created a very negative perception about statehood, particularly among the youth, who tend to be the most liberal and the most committed to clean government, democratic governance and so on. In focus groups that we hold at our center, when we ask the youth about this, about the decline and support for Palestinian statehood, again, separate from the two state solution, the answer is usually who needs another corrupt and authoritarian country. And so there is no doubt that the failure of governance on the part of the Palestinian Authority has done significant damage to the idea of Palestinian sovereignty and independence, the elite in power in the Palestinian Authority have failed their people in delivering good governance, but by doing so, they've also defeated their own goal of creating an independent and sovereign Palestinian state.

Ori Nir

So we have about 10 minutes left and I want to address a couple of questions. People asked about the issue of succession. I think we won't go into it because it's very speculative and I know that people don't we I'm sure that you wouldn't do not want to speculate too much. One question that I did want to address is the Abraham Accords. What is the attitude toward them and whether people see it, whether you see, any potential in those accords for pushing forward the agenda of Israeli-Palestinian peace. So that's one question. Maybe I'll ask the other as well. And that is a question that I think people have asked a lot recently and that is the issue of Haram al-Sharif, of Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Specifically, what I'd like to do is to help us explore the value of the site for Palestinians, not only as Muslims not only its religious value, but also its national value, its value as a national symbol, to Palestinians who view themselves as sort of Guardians of Al Aqsa Haram al-Sharif, the way that the Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia view themselves as the guardian of Mecca. So two questions here, one has to do with the Abraham Accords and the other with with Al Aqsa.

Khalil Shikaki

On the Abraham Accords, the perception of the Palestinians have not changed that these agreements do significant damage to the Palestinian cause, that they reduce the prospect for peace, because these arrangements offer the Israelis the benefits of peace without the Israelis making peace. And it reduces therefore the incentives for Israelis to make concessions in order to achieve peace. Why pay a price for something that you can have for free? That is the prevailing perception. But there is of course, an added emotional component to rejecting normalization, and that is the prevailing perception among the public that these countries are essentially abandoning the Palestinian cause, abandoning Jerusalem and the holy places in order to address their own self interest. For most of the public, this interest is the interest in confronting Iran, for example, is not seen by the Palestinians as an existential threat to these countries, that they would be willing to risk abandoning the entire cause of statehood for an independence for Palestinians. So they underestimate the kind of threats that these countries confront, and essentially focus on the negative consequences for the Palestinians. Now, it is, of course, one way for these countries to address this Palestinian concern is to make the issue of Israeli-Palestinian peace, central to normalization, if they bring back to the table, if they invite the Palestinian Authority to be part of the discussion, and to have on the agenda, the plans for reviving Israeli-Palestinian peace and negotiations and give the Arab countries the ability to be partners in this process of resolving the conflict, rather than just restricting normalization to bilateral interest, security or economic add to it a component of peace, so that every time the normalization discussion goes on, there is an Israeli-Palestinian-Arab peace component to that. That, in my view, can help improve the prospects for future normalization, while at the same time remind Israelis of the need to resolve the conflict, reminding them is not going to do much to change the situation. But to restore the Arab peace initiative, eventually, to what it is that is a normalization comes with a cost they need to make peace, end occupation, and so on. On the issue of, but before I leave normalization, I would say the emotional component has eased somewhat, because in not the most recent survey, but in one of our recent surveys, we did ask about the support that the United Arab Emirates gave to one of the hospitals in East Jerusalem. And surprisingly, we found a clear majority of the Palestinians looking positively on that and viewing that as serving the Palestinian interests and so on, so this was a significant development that dramatically changed, reflected the change that we saw compared to previous answers from the Palestinian public about relations with the United Arab Emirates. And even tourists coming to Al Aqsa, from the United Arab Emirates, their responses, soon after normalization broke out, was very, very negative and very grim. On the question of al-Haram Sharif. Now, for the Palestinians, of course, this is the third holiest place in Islam. And they do view in terms of international law, that this is occupied territories, and that the Palestinians should have the right to self determination in that particular area as well. And that the inclusion of, or allowing Israeli Jews to come and pray in that area, could lead to religious war. So there is significant concern about the new Israeli government and its attitude regarding these issues. What kind of religious rights Palestinians have or Israeli Jews have in the place. For the Palestinians, the threat posed to this, to the holy places today, is very different than in the past. And it could bring about serious violence, almost anything related to holy places, will most likely lead to significant erosion and security conditions, and instability in the West Bank. So now, because of the conflict, and because of the concerns about who controls the holy places, and can Jews pray there, and so on. This leads to significant unwillingness on the part of the Palestinians to recognize the Jewish links to the holy places. And in particular, to that particular place. This is something that wasn't in the past. If one looks at the literature by Palestinians or Muslims and Arabs in general, before the Arab-Israeli conflict started, we can see a very different narrative on the part of the Arabs and Muslims regarding the Jewish links to these holy places, under current conditions, however, one should not expect the Palestinian side to be, I'm talking about the public level or even the PA level, to be willing to publicly acknowledge these Jewish links to the holy places.

Ori Nir

Got it thanks. Before I ask Jim Klutznick, chair of the board to say a few things for closing. Just wanted to recognize the fact that today is Laylat al-Qadr and Thursday is the first day of Eid al-Fitr. So I wanted to wish both you, Khalil, and all our Muslim friends, a happy holiday, kol ‘am wa anta bekhair. And, Jim, the floor is yours.

Jim Klutznick

Okay. And I join in that, in the feelings about your holidays coming up now. Khalil, it was great when we saw you on our tour. And as always you enlighten us and everything. There's one thing, however, that I noticed was missing in the discussion today. And that was really the discussion of international negotiations. We didn't talk about America, we didn't talk about the history of Madrid, and whatnot. And yet in the meantime, both the Israelis and Palestinians seemed to make a real muddle of everything, as you pointed out today. And I would say today, the Israeli government is in no better shape than the Palestinian Authority, and probably maybe even worse, in some respects. And to me, I think there maybe has to be looked back at Madrid. Maybe we need some real international. I know it's in this world where, Russia is bombing in the Ukraine, and China threatens Taiwan and the rest of the Pacific basin, it might be naive to talk about international peace negotiations. But I think America, and in countries like Jordan, I pick those two, particularly because I see a certain sense of stability, a locus of stability that you could maybe form something about. Maybe it's time to step back and look at an international negotiation that might help people start to not just focus on the problems that everybody has, but what the prospects are, if you have the attention of the world on this. And I know the world seems to want to run off in different ways, and try to ignore the situation. But it's still the central issue. The Arab Peace Initiative in 2002 now comes back as the Abraham Accords, well, maybe they have an interest now and maybe in being part of a of a larger framework of international focus on this through a Madrid-type of approach. And this time, Arafat, who couldn't come, Abbas could come or his representative could come. And so I would hope you would think about that. And maybe one year in the United States in the fall, I hope you're planning to come back to Boston, some of us would love to talk to you about that. Because I still look at you as being the guy who's sort of the linchpin on all of this. And maybe I don't want to put that pressure on you in that regard, or too much of a spotlight because spotlights are not, not negative. Sometimes they become search lights. And we don't want that to happen to you. But we certainly would love to see in the United States and talk about that kind of thing. And I would value your thoughts about that.

Khalil Shikaki

Thank you, James. I'd be delighted to see you in Boston, in the near future in the fall. Certainly. And I agree that we do need a third party intervention, Israelis and Palestinians haven't really been able to put their act together, although, of course, it is their responsibility, first and foremost to do so. But there is no doubt that international forum and a U.S. role in bringing the parties back to the table is absolutely essential, given the current constraints on both sides. However, I would certainly insist that if Abbas goes to the Madrid forum that you talked about, that it is Abbas who received the mandate from the Palestinian public first, and someone who has received the legitimacy in elections. And not someone who has been avoiding holding elections.

Ori Nir

Thank you, Jim. And thank you Khalil for being so generous with your time and attention. I want to remind everyone that a recording of this webinar will be available on our YouTube channel, the video, and audio on our on PeaceCast our podcast, and this brings this webinar to an end. Thank you very much for joining. Thanks again, Khalil.

Khalil Shikaki

Thank you, good to be with you.

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